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Introduction
This paper investigates the significance of Harrison 
Salisbury’s Vietnam War coverage in the debate over 
the conduct of the war in the United States. Salisbury
,
s 
dispatches from Hanoi chal lenged the Johnson 
administration’s official representations about the war 
in Vietnam, and generated an explosive debate about 
the bombing of North Vietnam in the United States 
due to his revelations regarding civilian damage caused 
by the American bombing. He questioned not only the 
“surgical” precision of bombing runs targeting military 
facilities in populated areas, but also the basic purpose of 
the strategy itself. In Salisbury’s view, civilian casualties 
were being inflicted deliberately to break the morale of 
the populace, a course he believed to be both immoral 
and doomed to failure.1 Even before Salisbury’s coverage 
broke, the December 13-14 U.S. raids of 1966 were 
controversial among the American public. The major 
issue was the credibility of the United States government 
and people questioned whether Johnson administration 
officials had been truthful in its reports on level of 
destruction and death among civilians in North Vietnam. 
Throughout this period, Johnson administration officials 
repeatedly said that they bombed only military targets, 
that they had not bombed Hanoi, and that any civilian 
damage was purely accidental. Such statements created 
the false impression that “the bombing operations were 
executed with such “surgical” precision that they had 
dropped bombs only on the military targets.”2 Salisbury
,
s 
reports from North Vietnam, however, disclosed the 
reality of civilian casualties and damage to residential 
areas in North Vietnam.
Among earlier studies dealing with Salisbury’s Vietnam 
War coverage, Lawrence Mark Atwood’s article “Mission 
Intolerable：Harrison Salisbury’s Trip to Hanoi and the 
Limits of Dissent against the Vietnam War,”3 should be 
noted. However, Atwood did not refer to enough primary 
sources now available in order to verify the significance 
of Salisbury’s coverage which disclosed the reality of 
civilian damage. While his research is useful, I used 
much more primary sources here to discuss the issue 
extensively.
This paper is structured in the following three 
chapters. In Chapter 1, the nature of Salisbury’s 
reportage will be examined from two perspectives. 
The first perspective is Salisbury’s background. What 
were Salisbury’s motives in visiting North Vietnam? 
In answering this question, how deeply Salisbury was 
concerned about North Vietnam at the time will be 
examined through his background. The second one is 
Salisbury’s new perspective on the war in Vietnam, 
that is, the view from the enemy side. In Chapter 2, the 
circumstances of Salisbury’s trip to North Vietnam will 
be examined. Chapter 3 will take an in-depth look at 
Salisbury’s challenges to the Johnson administration’s 
claims about the war in Vietnam.
Chapter 1  The Nature of Salisbury’s Reportage
An assistant managing editor at The New York Times, 
Harrison Salisbury was the first American journalist 
allowed into North Vietnam and he covered conditions 
there from late 1966 to early 1967. Salisbury was an 
accomplished journalist working for The New York Times, 
one of the most prestigious and influential newspapers 
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in the United States and his revelations regarding 
the damage caused by the American bombing 
campaign in North Vietnam gave rise to a fierce 
controversy in the United States. The controversy 
over Salisbury
,
s coverage stemmed from the way 
he challenged the Johnson administration’s claims 
about the war in Vietnam. His reports from Hanoi 
had a great impact on the American public and 
aroused people
,
s suspicion regarding the Johnson 
administration
,
s statements of the conduct of the 
war in Vietnam.
Prior to his visit to Hanoi, Salisbury had spent much 
of his life visiting “difficult, inaccessible, impossible 
countries‒Communist countries for the most part.”4 
During World War II, as a United Press correspondent, 
he reported from London during the Blitz and Moscow 
during the Nazi advance across western Russia. 
After transferring to The New York Times in 1949, he 
became the first correspondent to visit post-Stalin 
Siberia and Central Asia. Salisbury subsequently won 
permission to report from other off-limit countries‒
such as Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Mongolia as well 
as the Soviet Union‒and he won a Pulitzer Prize for 
his coverage of the Soviet bloc in 1955. In addition, 
Salisbury also sought, but never received, permission 
to enter Communist China （the People’s Republic 
of China, PRC）. Salisbury described himself as “an 
intrepid traveler to the secretive communist capitals”5 
for his achievements in visiting Communist countries. 
In spite of his self-proclaimed position, Salisbury 
ultimately failed to finish his exploration of Communist 
nations. 
While attempting to secure a visa from the PRC 
government, Salisbury grew increasingly interested in 
North Vietnam and North Korea, which he described 
as the “two other hermit kingdoms on my list.”6 North 
Vietnam, in particular, held Salisbury’s attention, for 
reasons he makes clear in the following passage：
Korea had drifted further and further out of world 
interest but Vietnam, bloody, desperate, nagging, 
Vietnam the quagmire, bottomless reservoir of 
trouble, breeder of tension, eater of manpower, 
omnipresent danger, loomed larger and larger over 
the American scene.7
Salisbury began his campaign to visit North Vietnam 
by first sending a letter to the North Vietnam Premier 
Pham Van Dong proposing that “Hanoi permit an 
American journalist, a representative of the country’s 
greatest newspaper, to come and take a first-hand look at 
what was going on.”8
What were Salisbury’s motives in trying to visit 
North Vietnam? By 1966, President Johnson had 
rapidly escalated the U.S. military commitment to 
South Vietnam. As American troop levels rose and 
the bombing of North Vietnam intensified, relations 
between the United States and the rest of the world 
became increasingly strained. Nations in Asia and 
Europe, for example, criticized the escalation of the 
American intervention in Vietnam. Even in the United 
States, criticism emerged and debates over the conduct 
of the war galvanized politicians and policymakers in 
Washington. Among the American public, on the other 
hand, there was a growing disbelief in official statements, 
which led to the so-called “credibility gap”‒a public 
relations phrase conveying the lack of trust the American 
people had in official government statements. 
In his book, Salisbury commented on his serious 
reservations regarding the U.S. escalation of the war in 
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Vietnam, writing “Why, when France finally called it 
quits in Indochina, had we picked up the commitment? 
We had done this by our own positive action. It was 
not a casual deed. . . . Like most Americans I knew only 
in the vaguest of ways how we had gotten involved 
in Indochina.”9 Later in the book, Salisbury continues, 
“At first in such a small way that few even realized 
we had taken a stake in the conflict or the area, but 
which each year like some cancer had grown and 
grown until it now dominated the whole horizon of 
our concern.”10 As President Johnson escalated the 
U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and the “credibility gap” 
increasingly grew among the American public, Salisbury 
keenly hoped at least that “Out there on the ground I 
might gain some comprehension of what we were doing‒
and how we had gotten there.”11 It was against this 
background that Salisbury had tried to get permission to 
visit Hanoi.12
In the spring of 1966, Salisbury made two-and-a-half 
month trip around the periphery of China in an attempt 
to find an opening to Hanoi. After he returned to New 
York, Salisbury received an unexpected but influential 
supporter for his project‒Anne Morrison Welsh, widow 
of Norman Morrison, the American Quaker who had 
burned himself to death in front of the Pentagon in 
protest of the war in Vietnam. Morrison sacrificed his life 
in an attempt to rouse the conscience of the American 
people against the war in Vietnam. Norman Morrison, as 
Salisbury found when he arrived in Hanoi, was regarded 
“as a saint, an object of almost holy worship”13 for his 
actions. “His name was reverenced”14 in North Vietnam 
and Salisbury was told by the North Vietnamese that 
“Every North Vietnamese child knew his ［Morrison’s］ 
story.”15 Salisbury did not know Morrison or his widow, 
Anne Morrison. In his book, Salisbury described how he 
came to gain Anne Morrison’s support, writing “John 
Corry, a warm and sympathetic Times reporter, knew 
Anne Morrison. Through Corry’s good glances, she 
wrote a letter supporting my hopes for reporting from 
North Vietnam. She vouched for me.”16 Anne Morrison 
wrote a letter of inquiry to Hanoi on Salisbury’s behalf 
supporting his efforts to obtain a visa. Later in the book, 
Salisbury continues, “Anne’s words, I am certain, won 
my entry into Hanoi.”17 Her commitment to educating 
Americans about the conditions in North Vietnam is 
evident in a letter she wrote to Salisbury on April 
12, 1966：
At this critical time in international affairs, there 
is great need here for accurate information 
about conditions in Vietnam. . . . it is my belief 
that truth itself contains power to evoke change. 
Presenting Americans with a clearer and truer 
explanation of the Vietnam tragedy should increase 
the possibilities for a peaceful settlement. . . . 
We Americans have an equally acute need to 
sensitively understand the attitudes and aspirations 
of the North Vietnamese people, to know what they 
are experiencing in this war conducted in their 
territory. . . . I believe these needs can be met by 
first-hand reporting from within North and South 
Vietnam by newsmen such as you who have a 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿
9  Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 15.
10 Ibid., 16.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 5.
13 Harrison Salisbury, A Time of Change： A Reporter’s Tale of Our Time （New York： Harper & Row, 1988）, 119.
14 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 8.
15 Ibid.
16 Salisbury, A Time of Change, 119.
17 Ibid.
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reputation for objectivity and honesty.18
Anne Morrison respected the integrity of Salisbury’s 
writing and was willing to do what she could to support 
his efforts.19 
On December 15, 1966‒after an intense effort and with 
help from an unexpected supporter‒Salisbury finally 
received word from Hanoi granting him permission to 
enter North Vietnam. Salisbury could have gone to Hanoi 
a month earlier if the North Vietnamese invitation had 
not been curiously delayed in Paris business office of the 
Times international edition.20 This strange delay caused 
some controversy later, when U.S. officials, critical of 
Salisbury’s reports, argued that the North Vietnamese 
government wanted to exploit for its own propaganda 
purposes by allowing Salisbury to cover the results 
of the American raids of December 13 and 14. The 
bombing raids, which inflicted heavy civilian casualties, 
were already controversial in the United States and 
policymakers feared the impact of negative reportage on 
domestic audiences. In a confidential memorandum, then 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, said to Philippe Husson, 
a consular of French Embassy, “If Harrison Salisbury of 
the New York Times, for example, had received his visa 
only recently, then I supposed Hanoi’s main motives was 
connected with the current campaign on US bombing.”21 
In reality however, Hanoi’s decision to permit 
Salisbury to visit North Vietnam was made earlier 
than the December raids, and was not connected with 
the bombing campaign. Regardless of such behind-the-
scenes circumstances, Salisbury appreciated his lucky 
break, writing that the “visa could hardly have arrived 
at a more auspicious moment.”22 For months, from early 
1965 when American bombing campaign started, the U.S. 
government stated that the bombing of North Vietnam 
was directed at strictly military targets and was highly 
accurate. Contrary to the U. S. government reports, the 
North Vietnamese argued that on December 13 and 14, 
U.S. aircraft had penetrated into the center of Hanoi and 
dropped bombs within the principal urban areas, rather 
than the industrial outskirts. The U.S. government denied 
the Hanoi’s charge, even while the State Department 
admitted that the “possibility of an accident could not 
be ruled out.”23 Keenly aware of the situation in Hanoi, 
Salisbury was determined to provide a first-hand 
account：
Now, if all went well, I should reach Hanoi in 
time to make an eyewitness examination of the 
bombing charge. It should be possible to determine 
whether American planes had bombed the city or 
whether the North Vietnamese were just making 
propaganda as the Pentagon contended. The 
Defense Department declared that if damage had 
occurred within the city it must be due to misfiring 
of the powerful SAM’s‒the surface-to-air missiles 
that the North Vietnamese employed against 
American bombers.24
Realizing that “It might not be easy for a non-expert to 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿
18 Anne Morrison Welsh, Held in the Light： Norman Morrison’s Sacrifice for Peace and His Family’s Journey of Healing （New York： 
Orbis Books, 2008）, 110-111.
19 Morrison, Held in the Light, 110.
20 Salisbury, A Time of Change, 143.
21 Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Philippe Husson, Consular, French Embassy, the Department of State, 
December 30, 1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 27, Military Operations Viet-S, 
box 3014, National Archives and Records Administration II （hereafter NARA II）, College Park, Maryland.
22 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 9.
23 Harrison E. Salisbury, “A Visitor to Hanoi Inspects Damage Laid to U.S. Raids,” New York Times, December, 25, 1966.
24 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 10.
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determine whether damage had been caused by a missile 
or a bomb,” Salisbury was nonetheless determined that 
“he could try to find out and he would, in any event, be 
the first American to make an on-the-scene inspection.”25 
On the other hand, admitting that the American people 
carry a certain nationalist bias, America, he wrote, “had 
been free of the foreign invader or the threat of foreign 
conquest; this was the pride of our society, the product 
of our philosophy, of our own individual and stubborn 
American way of life.”26 Just as Salisbury wondered what 
chance “a small, alien, Asian nation fighting in its rice 
paddies against a foe whose only tangible presence was 
the quick flash of silver wings, the high-pitched whine of 
super-jet engines, the thunderous crash of bombs,” he also 
questioned “one reporter’s skill ［could］ bridge this chasm 
in experience, comprehend the totality of an Asian and 
an American life which hardly shared a single point?”27 
Nevertheless, Salisbury expressed his expectation for the 
timing of his arrival in Hanoi：
There was another dramatic aspect of the 
December 13-14 bombing. North Vietnamese 
officials contended that the attacks signaled a new 
step in American escalation. Now, they said, the 
United States was extending the bombing offensive 
right into the capital itself. It seemed possible that I 
would arrive in Hanoi at a significant turning point 
in the war.28 
Chapter 2  The Circumstances of Salisbury’s Trip to 
North Vietnam
His past experiences in communist countries 
aside, however, why was Harrison Salisbury granted 
permission to visit Hanoi by the North Vietnamese 
government, which until then had been almost entirely 
off-limits to Western reporters? What were Hanoi’s 
motives behind allowing Salisbury’s visit? Vietnamese 
sources show that the timing of the decision to admit 
Western journalists was due largely to Hanoi’s increasing 
anxiety in 1966 over the escalation of the American 
bombing campaign.29
On why Hanoi chose Salisbury, there are two likely 
reasons. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Salisbury 
worked for The New York Times‒the most prestigious and 
influential newspaper in the United States‒and whatever 
story he chose to write would undoubtedly attract the 
attention of U.S. policymakers and the American public. 
Secondly, Salisbury had more experiences than many 
of his colleagues in reporting from Communist nations. 
Hanoi officials likely regarded Salisbury as a reporter 
relatively sympathetic to their cause and they may 
have expected him to write stories favorable to North 
Vietnam. Furthermore, North Vietnamese leaders, who 
favored a negotiated end to the war, may have regarded 
Salisbury as a likely candidate to relay secret messages 
from Hanoi to Washington.30 Salisbury, himself, guessed 
that Hanoi’s decision “must mean a change in ［the 
North Vietnamese］ position even though ［I am］ darn 
sure they will talk tough in Hanoi.”31 Although Salisbury 
did not know if his assumption was accurate or not, he 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿
25 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 10.
26 Ibid., 10-11.
27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 10.
29 Lawrence, “Mission Intolerable, 433.
30 Ibid., 434. 
31 Harrison Salisbury Notebook, undated, box401, Harrison E. Salisbury Papers （hereafter Salisbury Papers）, Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York. 
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nonetheless believed that Hanoi would want to project 
an attitude of defiance and non-compromise toward the 
United States. According to Salisbury, “the visa was to 
be understood as a show of self-confidence： they were 
willing to let even an American journalist see what 
was going on behind their lines, how strong they were, 
how resolute their determination to fight to the end.”32 If 
these were indeed Hanoi’s motivations, Salisbury’s visit 
satisfied North Vietnamese expectation. On January 
4, 1967, when Salisbury was still in Hanoi, the Central 
Intelligence Agency （CIA ） reported on the North 
Vietnamese reaction to the journalist’s visit： 
The North Vietnamese were very pleased with the 
result of the visit by Harrison Salisbury, assistant 
manager of “The New York Times.” The North 
Vietnamese are now considering additional visits of 
this kind by “sympathetic” correspondents.33
Regardless of Hanoi’s reasons, Salisbury notated his 
own motivations in his diary on the Air France flight 
bound for Paris on December 19, 1966：
I think my trip is supposed to convey an image of 
confidence, of hardihood in the face of U.S. bombing; 
of horror at what we have done; a positive image of 
North Vietnam but at the same time it is designed 
to bring peace or a truce or talks nearer, in part 
by assuring the U.S. and U.S. opinion that the 
present policy is not winning; in part by showing a 
reasonableness on the part of North Vietnam.34
Chapter 3  Salisbury Challenges the Johnson
Administration’s Claims about the War in
Vietnam
Salisbury was an accomplished journalist working 
for one of the greatest and influential newspapers in 
the United States. Perhaps because of his status, or in 
spite of it, his revelations regarding civilian damage 
caused by the American bombing campaign in North 
Vietnam generated a fierce controversy in the United 
States. Salisbury wrote a series of twenty-two detailed 
stories, fourteen of which were based on his time in 
North Vietnam between December 23, 1966 and January 
7, 1967 （published in The New York Times between 
December 25 and January 9）. He wrote an additional 
eight stories during a stopover in Hong Kong （published 
between January 11 and 18）. Critical and supportive 
readers were both disturbed by Salisbury’s challenge to 
at least five of the Johnson administration’s claims about 
the war in Vietnam. 
First, Salisbury’s on-the-spot inspection revealed 
that American bombs had caused civilian damage, 
which contradicted the Administration’s statements 
claiming that the bombing campaign targeted purely 
military installations. A day after his arrival in Hanoi, on 
December 24, 1966, Salisbury inspected several damaged 
sites in Hanoi attributed to the United States raids of 
December 13 and 14. He revealed the damage in his first 
article from Hanoi, which appeared in the December 25, 
1966 issue of The New York Times. In the article, Salisbury 
wrote the following：
United States officials have contended that no 
attacks in built-up or residential Hanoi have 
been authorized or carried out. They have also 
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32 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 23.
33 CIA cable, “North Vietnamese Reaction to Harrison Salisbury Visit,” January 4, 1967, National Security File （hereafter 
NSF） Country File, Vietnam, box 39, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library （hereafter LBJL）, Austin, Texas. The 
source of this information is unknown because the part of the description of the source is blotted out in black.
34 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 24.
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suggested that Hanoi residential damage in the 
two raids could have been caused by defensive 
surface-to-air missiles that misfired or fell short. . . . 
This correspondent is no ballistics specialist, but 
inspection of several damaged sites and talks with 
witness make it clear that Hanoi residents certainly 
believe they were bombed by United States planes, 
that they certainly observed United States planes 
overhead and that damage certainly occurred right 
in the center of town . . . the Yenvien rail yard, 
which was listed as one of the targets in the raids 
Dec. 14 and 15, is in a built-up area that continues 
south west to the Red River with no visible breaks 
in residential quarters. Much the same is true of 
the Vandien truck park south of the city, which 
was another listed target. . . . It is unlikely that any 
bombing attack on such targets could be carried out 
without civilian damage and casualties.35
Contrary to Washington’s press release, Salisbury’s 
vivid descriptions of the bombings of nonmilitary sites 
in Nam Dinh, situated forty miles southwest of Hanoi, 
highlighted the problem of distinguishing between 
civilian and military targets. He disclosed the ground-
level reality of the bombings in an article printed in The 
New York Times on December 27, 1966：
The cathedral tower looks out on block after block 
of utter desolation . . . 13 percent of the city’s 
housing including the homes of 12,464 people, have 
been destroyed; 89 people have been killed and 
405 wounded. . . . No American communiqué has 
asserted that Nam Dinh contains some facility that 
the United States regards as a military objective. It 
is apparent, on personal inspection, that block after 
block of ordinary housing particularly surrounding 
a textile plant, has been smashed to rubble by 
repeated attacks of Seventh Fleet planes. The 
town lies only 20 miles inland, which may explain 
why the Seventh Fleet seems to have made it its 
particular target. The textile plant, whose most 
dangerous output from a military point of view 
would presumably be cloth for uniform, has been 
bombed 19 times.36
Salisbury concluded that the Johnson administration’s 
statements contradicted the reality in Hanoi. “Contrary 
to the impression given by United States communiqués,” 
Salisbury wrote, “on-the-spot inspection indicates that 
American bombing has been inflicting considerable 
civilian casualties in Hanoi and its environs for some time 
past.”37 Salisbury took his condemnation one step further 
in an article published on January 12, 1967：
President Johnson has stated American policy 
in simple terms. He said that the United States 
was bombing “steel and concrete” and that he 
was convinced American pilots were carrying out 
their orders. The North Vietnamese contended 
that the Unites States is pursuing a deliberate 
policy of terror bombing, with civilian population 
and nonmilitary objectives as the target. Wherein 
lies the truth? After two weeks of painstaking 
observation and inquiry on the ground in North 
Vietnam, this correspondent can report only what 
he saw and what he hear.38
Salisbury’s stories challenged another of Washington’s 
official representations of the war by questioning the 
strategic impact of the bombing campaign on North 
Vietnam. The Johnson administration defended the 
bombing as essential to destroy the North Vietnamese 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿
35 Harrison E. Salisbury, “A Visitor to Hanoi Inspects Damage Laid to U.S. Raids,” New York Times, December 25, 1966.
36 Harrison E. Salisbury, “U.S. Raids Batter 2 Towns; Supply Route Is Little Hurt,” New York Times, December 27, 1966.
37 Harrison E. Salisbury, “A Visitor to Hanoi Inspects Damage Laid to U.S. Raids,” New York Times, December 25, 1966.
38 Harrison E. Salisbury, “Bomb Controversy; View from the Ground,” New York Times, January 12, 1967.
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North Vietnamese had not been weakened and they were 
continuing to supply forces in the South. In other words, 
the bombing seemed to devastate North Vietnamese 
industry, such disruptions were only temporary. Rather 
than crushing the will of the people, the bombings 
strengthened North Vietnamese nationalism and the 
public’s enthusiasm to resist the U.S.
S a l i s bury’s  repo r t age  a l s o  cha l l enged  the 
administration on the relationship between the North 
Vietnamese government and the National Liberation 
Front （NLF）. The Johnson administration based U.S. 
policy on their belief that the NLF was Hanoi’s creation 
and had a strong relationship with the North Vietnamese 
government. Such assumptions led policymakers to 
assume that the conflict in South Vietnam was a 
case of Northern aggression, which legitimized U.S. 
intervention and justified anti-Communist rhetoric. 
Salisbury’s reportage, however, suggested that the 
NLF was an independent organization struggling to 
establish Southern independence, and that its policies 
differed significantly from those of the North Vietnamese 
government. Salisbury interviewed a member of the 
Central Committee of the NLF, Nguyen Van Tien. 
“Most Americans,” Salisbury wrote, “have assumed that 
the Liberation Front is a puppet of the North that was 
created by the North.” “Most Americans,” he continued, 
“believed that it is the creature of the North and that it 
is directed by the North.” Salisbury described the picture 
of the NLF and its role in Vietnam in an article printed in 
The New York Times on January 5, 1967：
As described by Mr. Tien, the Front is an 
independent entity . . . The Front and the North 
would have to discuss reunification on the basis 
of equality, he insisted, and the Front would 
then decide all matters for the South as far as 
reunification is concerned . . . Mr. Tien’s picture 
of the Liberation Front differed sharply from 
will to fight and to disrupt the flow of troops and war 
materials to the South. The President and his advisors 
believed that crushing morale and resupply routes 
would force the North to move toward negotiation. 
Salisbury
,
s ground-level inspection emphasized that the 
effect of American bombing on transportation had been 
minimal, and his reports suggested that disrupting supply 
movements was impossible when manpower offered 
alternatives to vehicles： 
The railroad and highway have been bombed 
again and again and again, but it is doubtful that 
rail traffic has ever been held up more than a few 
hours, and the highways seems capable of operating 
almost continuously regardless of how many bombs 
are dropped. . . . A basic flaw in the bombing 
policy from a military viewpoint would seem to be 
its failure to take into account the nature of the 
country and the people to which it is being applied. . 
. . Traffic and supplies simply flow around and past 
the point of interruption and the damage to rail or 
highway is quickly made good.39
Salisbury also asserted that the bombings, contrary 
to the Johnson administration’s claims, seemed only 
to strengthen the North Vietnamese will to fight. He 
observed that, “to the Vietnamese air alerts and air raids 
are deadly serious business. The pretty waitresses with 
rifles are part of this serious business,” and he insisted 
that “Being trained to man posts gives the populace a 
feeling of participation and of fighting back‒important 
in maintaining morale and counteracting the feeling of 
helplessness and defenselessness that civilian populations 
often experience.”40
These descriptions show that despite the rise in 
the intensity of bombing, and contrary to the U.S. 
government’s position that the American bombing 
campaign offered an effective solution, the morale of the 
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39 Harrison E. Salisbury, “U.S. Raids Batter 2 Towns; Supply Route Is Little Hurt,” New York Times, December 27, 1966.
40 Harrison E. Salisbury, “Hanoi During an Air Alert： Waitress Take Up Rifles,” New York Times, December 28, 1966.
 Harrison Salisbury and the Vietnam War ─The Significance of His Coverage on Civilian Damage in the War─
71
colony believe that the North Vietnamese are 
anyone’s puppets. In fact it is their determination to 
be independent of both the Soviet Union and China 
that often drives their closest friends to despair.44
Lastly, Salisbury’s dispatches challenged Washington by 
suggesting a willingness in Hanoi to negotiate a peaceful 
end to the war. The Johnson administration blamed the 
escalation of the war on Hanoi’s reluctance to explore a 
settlement. In a draft of response to a group of student 
leaders dated January 4, 1967, Secretary Rusk asserted：
We know that the effort at armed conquest which 
we oppose in Viet-Nam is organized, led, and 
supplied by the leaders in Hanoi. We know that 
the struggle will not end until those leaders decide 
that they want it to end. So we stand ready‒now 
and at any time in the future‒to sit down with 
representatives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret, 
to work out arrangements for a just solution.45
Similarly, in a draft statement for President Johnson’s 
1966 Union message which was filed by Rusk as well, the 
Johnson administration’s effort to achieve a negotiated 
settlement was reasserted：
We are, of course, ready to send a representative 
to discuss with the governments of South Vietnam 
and North Vietnam the question of a cessation of 
hostilities. . . .I ［President Johnson］ have sent our 
representatives to the end of the earth over and 
over again to seek every possibility of a peaceful 
settlement.46
that held by many in the United States that it 
is an organization created and directed by and 
subservient to the Hanoi regime.41
Salisbury’s fourth challenge centered on the U.S. 
characterizations of the North Vietnamese people. U.S. 
officials tended to consider the entire population of 
North Vietnam as the enemy, and they described the 
North Vietnamese as “a weak-willed, conformist people 
exploited by a ruthless, cunning leadership, a pattern that 
two decades of the Cold War had conditioned Americans 
to expect of Communist insurgents.”42 In the conversation 
with Salisbury on January 2, 1967, the North Vietnamese 
Premier, Pham Van Dong mentioned that he had in mind 
“the persistent view in the United States that North 
Vietnamese was a ‘puppet’ of the Soviet Union or China 
or both.”43 In other words, U.S. officials were blinded by 
their own anti-Communist ideology in the context of the 
Cold War, misreading the national liberation movement of 
Vietnamese as a form of aggression by the Communists. 
Contrary to the Johnson administration’s stereotypes of 
North Vietnamese people, however, Salisbury described 
the earnestness and spiritual intensity of the spirit of the 
North Vietnamese. The war effort, Salisbury concluded, 
was due in large part to the fierce independence of the 
North Vietnamese people：
The spirit of the North Vietnamese people seems 
to be a combination natural vitality and intense 
patriotism, a determination to run Vietnam for 
and by Vietnamese and an element of teen-age 
cockiness and daredevilry . . . The Vietnamese are 
warm, direct people . . . No one in Hanoi’s diplomatic 
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41 Harrison E. Salisbury, “Aide Says Liberation Front Is Independent of the North,” New York Times, January 5, 1967.
42 Lawrence, “Mission Intolerable,” 438.
43 Harrison E. Salisbury, “North Vietnamese Spirit Found High,” New York Times, January 11, 1967.
44 Ibid.
45 Memos to the President from Walt Rostow, January 4, 1967, NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 18, box 
12, JBJL.
46 Walt Rostow to President Johnson, December, 31, 1966, NSF Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, box 12, LBJL.
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Furthermore, I believe that the debate over Salisbury
,
s 
reportage provides a unique opportunity to examine 
the U.S. government’s failure to recognize the civilian 
damage of the bombings and to reconsider its conduct of 
the war in Vietnam.49
Conclusion
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Salisbury challenged 
at least five of the Johnson administration
,
s claims 
about the war in Vietnam. First, Salisbury
,
s on-
the-spot inspection revealed that American bombs 
had caused civilian damage, which contradicted the 
Administration
,
s statements claiming that the bombing 
campaign targeted purely military installations. Second, 
his coverage questioned the strategic effectiveness 
of the bombing campaign on North Vietnam. Third, 
Salisbury
,
s reportage challenged the administration 
on the relationship between the North Vietnamese 
government and the National Liberation Front 
（NLF）. Salisbury’s fourth challenge centered on the 
U.S. characterizations of the North Vietnamese people. 
Lastly, Salisbury’s dispatches challenged Washington by 
suggesting a willingness in Hanoi leaders to negotiate a 
peaceful end to the war.
Regarding to civilian damage, as demonstrated 
in the CIA documents declassified later, Johnson 
administration had intensive CIA studies and other 
secret appraisals around the same time based on post-
strike photography. Those studies reported on civilian 
damage and casualties inflicted by U.S. bombings of 
North Vietnam.50 Johnson administration officials, 
however, claimed that they were bombing military 
targets and that possible measures were being taken 
to minimize civilian damage while acknowledging that 
As is obvious in above statements, “the Johnson 
administration frequently declared itself open to talks 
with North Vietnam and blamed Hanoi for obstructing 
progress toward a peaceful resolution.”47 The North 
Vietnamese that Salisbury encountered, however, 
seemed open to negotiations. In a four-and-a-half-
hour conversation with Salisbury on January 2, 1967, 
the North Vietnamese Premier, Pham Van Dong, 
discussed Hanoi’s four points for ending the war, which 
fundamentally indicated Hanoi’s willingness to talk. 
Salisbury described the detailed discussion in an article 
appeared in the January 4, 1967 issue of The New York 
Times：
In a detailed discussion of North Vietnam’s views 
on the war in Vietnam, Premier Pham Van Dong 
emphasized that once hostilities were brought to an 
end, it would be possible to “speak of other things.” 
“The moment the United States puts an end to the 
war, we will respect each other and settle every 
question.” he said. “Why don’t you ［The United 
States］ think that way?”. . . “The big question,” 
he added, “is to reach a settlement which can be 
enforced.” “The party which has to make first step 
is Washington,” he continued, “We have no doubt on 
this point.”48
As mentioned above, the controversy over Salisbury
,
s 
coverage stemmed from the way he challenged the 
Johnson administration’s claims about the war in 
Vietnam. His vivid on-the-spot reports from Hanoi had 
a great impact on the American public and aroused 
people
,
s suspicion regarding the Johnson administration
,
s 
statements of the conduct of the war in Vietnam. 
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47 Lawrence, “Mission Intolerable,” 440.
48 Harrison E. Salisbury, “Hanoi Premier Tells View; Some in U.S. Detect a Shift,” New York Times, January 4, 1967.
49 See in detail Akemi Kuzuya, “The U.S. Government’s Response to Harrison Salisbury’s Vietnam War Coverage,” 
Kokusai Chiiki Bunka Kenkyuu, Nanzan Daigaku Daigakuin Kokusai Chiiki Bunka Kenkyuu-ka, No. 7, 2012, 245-275.
50 See in detail Kuzuya, “The U.S. Government’s Response to Harrison Salisbury’s Vietnam War Coverage.” 
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the American public to maintain the U.S. credibility and 
to justify U.S. policy in Vietnam. In addition, the Russell 
Tribunal failed to have expected effect partly because 
it was not an institution but a private tribunal and did 
not replace any established body.55 Though the U.S. 
government officials fully recognized civilian damage 
caused by their bombing, the reality of civilian damage 
was never disclosed to the American public.
However, Salisbury disclosed that cities and civilian 
constructions had been hit and many civilians were 
killed throughout the country by American bombing in 
contradiction to the U.S. government’s statements. His 
revelations generated a fierce controversy in the United 
States. Because of his status, an accomplished journalist 
at The New York Times, one of the greatest and established 
newspapers in the United States, Salisbury’s coverage 
could provide an opportunity for the American public to 
acknowledge the reality of civilian damage. Furthermore, 
his revelation had the potential to reorient the debate 
over the conduct of the war in Vietnam and to force a 
fundamental reconsideration of American policymakers’ 
understandings of war. It was what Salisbury expected. 
He notated in his diary on December 19, 1966 that “… it 
［my trip］ is designed to bring peace or a truce or talks 
nearer, in part by assuring the U.S. and U.S. opinion that 
the present policy is not winning; in part by showing a 
reasonableness on the part of North Vietnam.”56
civilian casualties would inevitably occur in connection 
with the bombing of military targets. 51 On the other 
hand, in 1967, the International War Crimes Tribunal 
（the Russell Tribunal） proved the American bombing 
of civilians, of the systematic and deliberate bombing of 
the civilian population of North Vietnam and took the 
decision that the United States of America has committed 
a war crime.52 However, during the Tribunal, the Johnson 
administration ignored the Tribunal and repeatedly said 
that they were bombing only military targets, and that 
any civilian damage was caused accidentally.
Regarding to the strategic effectiveness of the 
bombing, Johnson administration also had several CIA 
reports that emphasized that “it seems clear that the air 
campaign by itself cannot persuade Hanoi to abandon 
the war.”53 In addition, In December 1966 and again 
in 1967, the Pentagon paused and requested the Jason 
Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis to assess 
the effect of the bombing on North Vietnam. The report 
was a “categorical rejection of bombing as a tool of 
our policy in Southeast Asia…” The expectation that 
bombing would “erode the determination of Hanoi and 
its people clearly overestimated the persuasive and 
disruptive effects of the bombing, and correspondingly, 
underestimated the tenacity and recuperative capabilities 
of the North Vietnamese.” Despite the reports, the 
bombing of an ever-expanded list targets in North 
Vietnam continued.54
The Johnson administration ignored the “well-
documented” assessment. CIA reports were deliberately 
hidden within the Johnson administration as well as from 
＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿
51 The Pentagon Papers, 135. President Johnson made a statement to the press on December 31, ［1966］ that “the bombing 
was directed against legitimate military targets and that every effort was being made to avoid civilian casualties.” 
52 John Duffett ed., Against the Crime of Silence： Proceedings of the International War Crimes Tribunal （New York： A Clarion Book, 
1968）. 
53 See in detail Kuzuya, “The U.S. Government’s Response to Harrison Salisbury’s Vietnam War Coverage.”
54 Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young ed., Bombing Civilians： a Twentieth-Century History （New York： The New Press, 2009）, 
164-165.
55 Duffett, Against the Crimes of Silence, 43. 
56 Salisbury, Behind the Lines, 24.
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